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Misdelivery under Forged Bills and
Misdelivery in the absence of Original
Bills and Exemption Clauses
William K W Leung
Introduction
A transport document has two basic functions. The first is to evidence
receipt of the goods by the carrier. The second is to evidence the terms of
the contract of carriage. In the case of a negotiable bill of lading, it also
has a third function of acting as a document of title. The last is most
important where a bank intends to look to its possession of documents for
security.
A bill will only operate as a document of title if it is drafted as an
'order' bill, ie a bill order which the carrier agrees to deliver the goods at
their destination to a named consignee or to his 'order or assigns'. A
negotiable bill of lading! is attractive as security for a commercial redit
and the holder of the bill may transfer a good title to the goods during
transit. This article will focus on the issues of misdelivery under 'order'
bills.
While 'order' bills are transferable by endorsement, they are not
technically negotiable instruments, since a bona fide transferee gets no
better title to the goods covered by the bill than was held by the transferor.
The bill merely 'represents' the goods and possession of the bill of lading
is treated as equivalent to possession of the goods covered by it - no more,
1 A brief consideration of what is a bill of lading is found in Sasoon on CIF and FOB Contracts ((3'" edn)
British Shipping Laws Vol 5, para 132) which states: 'A bill of lading is a document which is signed by the
carrier or his agent acknowledging that goods have been shipped on board a particular vessel bound for a
particular destination and stating the terms on which the goods so received are to be carried.'
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no less. In the colourful words of Bowen LJ in Sanders v Maclean2
'A cargo at sea while in the hands of the carrier is necessarily incapable
of physical delivery. During this period of transit and voyage the bill of
lading, by the law merchant, is universally recognised as its symbol and the
indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading operates as a symbolic
delivery of the cargo. Property in the goods passes by such indorsement
and delivery of the bill of lading whenever it is the intention of the parties
that the property should pass, just as under similar circumstances the
property would pass by an actual delivery of the goods ... it is the key
which, in hands of the rightful owner, is intended to unlock the door of the
warehouse, floating or fixed, in which the goods may chance to be.
There are three purposes for which possession of the bill may be
regarded as equivalent to possession of the goods covered by it:
a) The holder of the bill is entitled to delivery of the goods at the port
of discharge.
b) The holder can transfer the ownership of the goods during transit
merely by endorsing the bill.
c) The bill can be used as security for a debt.3
It is of the essence of the nature of a bill of lading contract that a
shipowner is both entitled and bound to deliver the goods against
production of an original bill of lading, provided he has no notice of any
other claim or better title to the goods.4 Once a bill of lading has been
issued, only a holder of the bill can demand delivery of the goods at the
port of discharge 'because of the existence of this principle that a bill of
2 (1883) llQBO 327 at 341.
J Wilson JF, Carriage a/Goods by Sea, 3'" Edn, Pitman Publishing, 136.
4 See Glyn Mills Currie & Co. v. East and West India Dock Company, 1882, 7 App Cas 591; The Stettin, 1899
14 PGO 142; Carlberg v. Wemyss, [1915] SC 616 at 624; Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd, v Rambler Cycle Co Ltd, [1959]
2 Lloyd's Law Report 114; [1959] AC 576; Barclays Bank Ltd. v Commissioners o/Customs and Excise [1963]
1 Lloyd's Law Report 81, and most recently Kuwait Petroleum Corporation v KD Oil Carriers Limited, (The
Houda) [1994]2 Lloyd's Law Report 541, see especially at 550,552-553 and 556.
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lading can be used as a document of title so that the transfer of the
document transfers also the right to demand the cargo from the ship at
discharge. ,5
Once the master has signed a bill of lading and parted with it, he has
subjected the shipowners to a contractual obligation enforceable at the suit
of any person to whom the bill of lading has been negotiated to deliver the
cargo to any person to whom the bill of lading has been negotiated or any
other persons so direct. 6 The master takes an obvious risk if he delivers
the goods without production of the bill of lading. He does not obtain a
good discharge unless the person to whom he delivers is the person entitled
to them. However, the master has no means of satisfying himself that that
person is so entitled unless that person produces the bill of lading. As
Lord Denning said in Sze Hai Tong Bank v Rambler Cycle, 7
'It is perfectly clear law that a shipowner who delivers without
production of the bill of lading does so at his peril. The contract is to
deliver, on production of the bill of lading, to the person entitled under
bill of lading... The shipping company did not deliver the goods to
any such person. They are therefore liable for breach of contract
unless there is some term in the bill of lading protecting them. And
they delivered the goods, without production of the bill of lading, to a
person who was not entitled to receive them. They are therefore
liable in conversion unless likewise so protected.'
A true owner cannot in the absence of some special arrangement oblige
a shipowner to deliver his goods to him without presenting his bill of
lading: either he must have agreed in his contract with the shipowner that
an indemnity will suffice, or he must persuade the shipowner to deliver
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation v I & D Oil Carriers Limited, (The Houda) [1994J 2 Lloyd's Law Report
541 Lord Justice Neil at 550.
" Kuwait Petroleum Corporation v I & D Oil Carriers Limited (The Houda) [1994]2 Lloyd's Law Report 541,
Lord Justice Millet at 556.
7 [1959J 2 Lloyd's Rep 114; [1959J AC 576
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against an indemnity, or he must seek the assistance of the Court. In
practice, where the goods' owner has a reasonable explanation for the
absence of his bill of lading plus a suitable indemnity provided by a bank,
it will likely satisfy the shipowner.8
Misdelivery under forged bills of lading
A forged bill of lading is in the eyes of the law a nullity. It is simply a
piece of paper with writing on it, which has no effect whatever. Delivery
of the goods upon production of a forged bill of lading is therefore in
exchange for a worthless piece of paper and not for the original bill of
lading. Two forms of questions will arise from misdelivery under a
forged bill of lading: first, is a shipowner entitled to deliver against a
forged bill of lading?; second, can a shipowner be obliged to deliver
against a forged bill of lading?
If the forgery is known or suspected or if the shipowner is on notice of
the possibility of forgery, the answer to both questions must be 'no'. If
the forgery cannot reasonably be detected, it was held, in abita,9 that
should a shipowner obstinately refuses to deliver against the forged bill,
despite his ignorance of the deception, he cannot be liable for that refusal
to the holder of the forged bill. He may have acted in ignorance, but he
acted correctly. He is justified in his refusal by the fact of forgery.
If the forgery cannot reasonably be detected and the shipowner has
released the goods upon production of a forged bill of lading, will the
shipowner be liable? It was held 10 that the shipowner will be liable.
The issue is one of risk: a shipowner issues bills of lading to serve as the
key to the goods and ought usually to be well-placed to recognize his own
bills of lading. A bill of lading serves an important general role in
representing and securing both title to and physical possession of goods.
Has the shipowner a defence in delivering, against a forged bill, in
, Matis Exports Limited v Dampskibsselskabet AF 1912 (The Motis). [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 837 at 842 (Mf
Justice Rix)
9 [1999]1 Lloyd's Rep 837 at p842 (Mf Justice Rix)
10 [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 211 at p217, Mance U
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ignorance of the forgery? If a shipowner was entitled to deliver goods
against a forged bill of lading, then the integrity of the bill as the key to a
floating warehouse will be lost. Moreover, as between shipowner and the
goods' owner, it is the shipowner who controls the form, signature and
issue of his bills, even if as a matter of practice, he may delegate much of
that to his charterers or their agents. If one of two innocent people must
suffer for the fraud of a third, it is better that the loss falls on the shipowner,
whose responsibility it is both to look to the intergrity of his bills and to
care for the cargo in this possession and to deliver it aright, rather than on
the true goods' owner, who holds a valid bill and expects to receive his
goods in return for it.
It is therefore, no defence for a shipowner to be deceived innocently
into releasing a cargo by the production of a forged bill of lading.
In Matis Exports Limited v Dampskibsselskabet AF 1912 11 the
plaintiff was the shipper of various consignments of goods under a number
of Maersk Line bills of lading at ports in China and Hong Kong in July and
August, 1996 and January, 1997. The goods were carried to Cotonou and
Abidjan in West Africa on the vessels owned or operated by the two
defendants who together ran a liner service under the name of 'Maersk
Line'. The issue for the court to decide was whether the defendants were
liable for the loss of the goods after discharge from their vessel, where the
cause of the loss was the use of forged bills of lading to obtain delivery
orders in respect of and thus delivery of the goods at the discharge ports.
The defendant relied upon an exclusion clause which provided as
follows:
5 Carrier's Responsibility
...3. Carriage to and from Countries other than USA...
(b) Where the carriage called for commences at the port of loading
and/or finishes at the port of discharge, the Carrier shall have no
liability whatsoeverfor any loss or damage to the goods while in its
actual or constructive possession before loading or after discharge
over ship's rail, or if applicable, on the ship's ramp, however caused.
The necessary defence was, if the goods were lost to the plaintiffs, the
11 Ibid 211 [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 837
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losses occurred some time after the goods had been passed over the ship's
rail at the port(s) of discharge when they were delivered against the
aforesaid delivery orders as a result of the criminal deception and fraud
practised upon the defendants' agents. As the goods had been lost by such
deception and/or theft, by virtue of Clause 5 (3)(b) of the Bills of Lading,
the defendant submitted that they were under no liability whatsoever in
respect of such loss of the goods. The defendant submitted that this was
'loss' of the goods within the same clause just as much as if the goods had
been stolen out of the possession of the shipowners after discharge and
indeed it could have been regarded as theft.
It was held that the shipowners' construction of Clause 5(3)(b) of that
bill of lading would appear to go the extreme of protecting against any
misdelivery, however negligent, and to undervalue the importance which
both parties must be taken to have attached to the ship's obligation to
deliver against presentation of original bills of lading.
So far as the owner of the goods is concerned, there is little difference
between theft of the goods by taking them without consent of the bailee
and delivery with his consent where the consent is obtained by fraud. It
was held by the Court of Appeal in Matis that'the natural subject-matter of
Clause 5(3)(b) consists in loss or damage caused to the goods while in the
carrier's custody, but not deliberate delivery up of the goods, whether
without any bill of lading or against a forged and therefore null document
believed to be a bill of lading'. It was further held that Clause 5(3)(b)
was'not apt on its natural meaning to cover delivery by the carrier or his
agent, albeit the delivery was obtained by fraud.' Even if the language
was apt to cover such a case, it was not a construction which should be
adopted since such construction will involve excusing the shipowner from
performing an obligation of such fundamental importance: delivery of
goods only upon production of original bill of lading. As a matter of
construction, the Court lean against such a result 'if adequate content can
be given to the clause.' The shipowners' construction of Clause 5(3)(b)
appear to go to the extreme of protecting against misdelivery, however
negligent, and to undervalue the importance which both the shipowner and
the cargo owner must be taken to have attached to the ship's obligation to
deliver against presentation of original bills of lading. It was further said
in obitet, that "... an appropriately worded clause" could have been
devised to protect the carrier, but if the shipowner wanted to have
protection against production of forged bills, it could seem that an express
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reference would almost certainly be necessary. Anything less than an
express reference would probably fail because of the court's unwillingness
to excuse 'an obligation of such fundamental importance,.12 However,
Clause 5(3)(b) of that Bill of lading 'was not sufficiently clear.' 13
Misdelivery in the absence of original bills
One of the key provisions of the bill of lading, so far as the shipper is
concerned, is the promise not to deliver the cargo other than in return for
an original bill of lading. The requirement to deliver the goods only against
presentation of an original bill of lading is therefore one of the main
objects of the contract. A shipowner who delivers without production of
the bill of lading does so at his peril. The contract is to deliver, on
production of the bill of lading, to the person entitled under the bill of
lading. If the shipping company did not deliver the goods to any such
person, they are therefore liable for breach of contract unless there is some
term in the bill of lading protecting them. If they delivered the goods,
without production of the bill of lading, to a person who was not entitled to
receive them, they are therefore liable in conversion unless likewise so
protected. This principle protects the shipper from fraud and also protects
the shipowner.
A shipowner is not bound to deliver goods except in exchange for the
bill of lading. He is not bound to take on trust that he knows the
consignee and that no intermediate rights had been created. Neither the
owner, his agent, nor the master can be called upon to accept a banker's or
any other guarantee of an indemnity, though such a thing is not unknown,
and in the event of total loss of the bill of lading might have to be resorted
to, if necessary at the sight of the court.
In practice, if the bill of lading is not available, delivery is effected
against an indemnity. Where the bill of lading is lost, the remedy, in
default of agreement, is to obtain an order of the Court upon tendering a
sufficient indemnity. The loss of the bill of lading is not to be treated as a
defence.
The extent to which an exemption clause may protect shipowners is to
12 Gaskell N, Bills ofLading: Law & Contracts, LLP, 2000, 452.
13 Matis [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 216 and 217, Mance U
92
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
be examined here. The courts' approach to exemption clauses has always
been that clear words would be required for the parties to be held to have
contracted out of it. The clause should be construed so as to enable effect
to be given to one of the main objects and intention of the contract, namely
that the goods would only be delivered to the holder of an original bill of
lading. As a matter of construction, it is permissible to limit the ambit of
a particular clause in the light of that fact. In Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd v
Rambler Cycle Co Ltd 14 the manufacturer shipped from England to
Singapore bicycle parts under a bill of lading requiring the goods to be
delivered 'unto order or his or their assigns', with the exemption clause
therein provided that:
... the responsibility of the carrier ... whether as carrier or as custodian
or bailee of the goods ... shall be deemed ... to cease absolutely after
the goods are discharged from the ship. After discharge the carrier's
agent released the goods to the consignee ....
This is a classical standard 'before and after' clause devised by the
shipowner trying to claim exemption from potential liability from
shipowners. Lord Denning said15 :
'The exemption, on the face of it, could hardly be more
comprehensive, and it is contended that it is wide enough to absolve
the shipping company from responsibility for the act of which the
Rambler Cycle Company complains, that is to say, the delivery of the
goods to a person who, to their knowledge, was not entitled to receive
them. If the exemption clause upon its true construction absolved the
shipping company from an act such as that, it seems that by parity of
reasoning they would have been absolved if they had given the goods
away to some passer-by or had burnt them or thrown them into the
sea. ... There is, therefore, an implied limitation on the clause, which
cuts down the extreme width of it; and, as a matter of construction,
their Lordships decline to attribute to it the unreasonable effect
contended for. ..But their Lordships go further.
14 [1959]2 Lloyd's Rep 114; [1959] A C 576
15 Ibid 120-121; 586-588
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If such an extreme width were given to the exemption clause, it
would run counter to the main object and intent of the contract. For
the contract. .. , has, as one of its main objects, the proper delivery of
the goods by the shipping company, "unto order or his or their
assigns," against production of the bill of lading.
It would defeat this object entirely if the shipping company was at
liberty, at its own will and pleasure, to deliver the goods to somebody
else, to someone not entitled at all, without being liable for the
consequences. The clause must therefore be limited and modified to
the extent necessary to enable effect to be given to the main object and
intent of the contract: see Glynn v Margetson & C016; GH Renton &
Co Limited v Palmyra Trading Corporation ofPanama. 17
To what extent is it necessary to limit or modify the clause? It
must at least be modified so as not to permit the shipping company
deliberately to disregard its obligations as to delivery ... deliberately
disregarded one of the prime obligations of the contract. No Court
can allow so fundamental a breach to pass unnoticed under the cloak
of a general exemption clause... '
Lord Denning's reference to fundamental breach cannot now stand
in the light of the subsequent authorities. 18 The ground of the decision,
as subsequently explained by Lord Reid in the House of Lords19 was
that:
, ... the clause must be limited and modified to the extent necessary to
enable effect to be given to the main object and effect of the
contract. .. '
16 Glyee v Margetson & Co [1893] AC 351 at 357
17 [1956]1 QB 462 at 501; [1955] 2 Lloyd's Rep 722 at 741
18 Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1966] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 529; [1967]1 A C 361 and Photo Productions Ltd v Securicor Tramport Ltd [1980J I Lloyd's Rep 545;
[1980]AC827
19 Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale 11966]1 Lloyd's
Rep 529 at 546, col. 1; [1967] 1 A.c. 361 at 401
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Most of the delivery clauses in modern container bills of lading give
wide rights to the carrier to deal with the goods where they have not been
collected. These may well use the language of a 'cesser' of liability and
purport to excuse for a wider variety of events than the standard 'before
and after' clause. The express clauses often give the right to store the
goods and to charge the costs of storage to the cargo interests. In some
cases the costs of storage may be set out in the carrier's tariff. In addition
to the storage costs, there may well be demurrage claims. Where there is
no documentation available, for example, because the bill of lading is
delayed in the banking system or no bill of lading has ever been issued, the
costs incurred by the carrier (including unpaid freight) could well exceed
the value of the goods themselves. The carrier may be faced with claims
for delivery from a number of potential claimants in circumstances where
it is not clear to whom delivery should be made. In such cases the carrier
may decide to interplead and claim relief from the court. In general, the
carrier would be entitled to claim that the costs of preserving the cargo and
the legal costs of the interpleader relief. The carrier may retain any funds
held by the carrier received, for example, where the cargo was sold. The
carrier may also require such amount of sums to be paid as a condition of
releasing the cargo, for example, to allow the cargo to be sold so as to
minimise any future costs. It seems that where a carrier seeks interpleader
relief, it can never be at risk of damages for conversion.
The provisions in the contract should be construed as not excluding
the responsibility of the shipowners where they or their agents misdeliver
the goods regardless of whether did so in deliberate and conscious
disregard of the rights of the cargo owners.
The question is thus whether the words in any of the clauses relied
upon are sufficient to excuse misdelivery of the goods after discharge.
In The 'Ines' 20, the exemption clause provides:
3. PERIOD OF RESPONSIBILITY
Goods in the custody of the carrier or his agent. .. before loading and
after discharge ... are in such custody at the sole risk of the owners of
the goods and thus the carrier has no responsibility whatsoever for the
goods prior to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the
2U MB Pyramid Sound MV v Briese Schiffaurts GmbH (The Ines) [1995] Lloyd's Rep 144
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ocean vesseL ..
5. FORWARDING, SUBSTITUTE OF VESSEL, THROUGH
CARGO AND TRANSSHIPMENT
... the Carrier to be at liberty to ... store the goods ... on shore ...
The responsibility of the carrier shall be limited to the part of the
transport performed by him in a vessel under his management and no
claim will be acknowledged by the carrier for damage or loss arising
during any other part of the transport. ..
7. RECEPTION OF THE GOODS
(a) The Receiver... must be ready to take delivery of the goods as soon
as the vessel is ready to unload ...
(b)Receiver cannot demand delivery of goods direct from ship without
special agreement. ..
(c) General local clause Landing ... of the goods to be arranged by
Carrier's agents for the risk and expense of the Shipper whether
delivery is taken overside or in the quay.
The defendant shipowner submitted that the effect of those clauses
was that the responsibility of the carrier was to cease on discharge from the
ship and that any loss caused by any event occurring thereafter is not
recoverable. In particular, they said that by Clause 3 the carrier was to
have no responsibility whatsoever for the goods subsequent to their
discharge from the ocean vessel. It follows, they submitted, that they
were not liable to the plaintiff cargo owners on the facts of this case
because the misdelivery occurred some days after discharge when the
goods were delivered without production of an original bill of lading.
They relied upon a number of authorities and said that the only
circumstances in which they would have been liable would have been
where they acted either in deliberate disregard of the rights of the plaintiff
cargo owners or dishonestly.
It was held by Clarke J, that Clause 3 "concerned with loss of or
damage to the goods and may well include the case where the goods are
96
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stolen, but it is not concerned with misdelivery.,,21 It was also held that
Clause 5 "does not seem to be concerned with misdelivery." There is
however no hint in the wording of Clause 7 that carrier is to be entitled to
deliver otherwise than in return for an original bill of lading or even that he
is not to be liable if he does do. Thus Clause 7 also does not concern with
misdelivery. Although the plaintiffs were in breach of Clause 7 because
they were not ready to take delivery as soon as the vessel was ready to
discharge, any loss suffered by them was not caused by that breach but by
the delivery of the goods without presentation of an original bill of lading.
In a recent Hong Kong case Center Optical (Hong Kong) Limited v
Jardine Transport Services (China) Limited and Pronto Cargo Corporation
(Third Party),22 the goods consisted of two consignments of optical frames
and sunglasses. Both consignments were shipped from Shanghai to
Miami in mid-1998. The first consignment of 248 cartons of optical
frames was carried under bill of lading No SHA472927 dated 25 May,
1998 on the vessel Alligator Wisdom. The second consignment of 348
cartons of sunglasses was carried under bill of lading No SHA472986 on
the vessel Hanjin New York. The two shipments were part of a sequence
of nine such shipments whereby the plaintiff exported spectacle frames and
sunglasses which had been manufactured in China by an affiliated
company, Wenzhou Centre Optical Co. Limited to an related third party
in Miami, Center Optical HK Inc (Miami Center Optical). The first six
shipments were sent by the plaintiff to Miami ex Hong Kong.
In March, 1998, the plaintiff suggested to the buyer that it should ship
direct from Shanghai to Miami. This was agreed with the buyer
suggesting the use of Jardine Freight Services (HK) Ltd. This company
referred the plaintiff to Jardine Transport Services (China) Limited (JTSC),
the defendant in Shanghai.
On 25 May 1998, JTSC issued the Alligator Wisdom bill which was in
'Dynamic Container Line' (DCL) form, named the plaintiff as shipper, the
consignee as 'To Order' and the notify party as 'Center Optical HK Inc'.
The third party in the proceedings Pronto was named as 'F/Agent';
Shanghai in China was named as the load port and Miami in the United
States was named as the port of discharge. The number of packages
represented by this bill was stated to be 248 cartons and the bill itself was
21 Ibid at 144 Mr Justice Clark
22 [2001] Lloyd's Rep 678
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marked 'freight collect' .
The issuance of this bill led to a chain of sub-bills which named JTSC
as shipper and Pronto as consignee and notify party. A like sequence
occurred with regard to the eight shipment of 348 sunglasses on Hanjin
New York. On arrival at Long Beach, the seventh and eighth shipments
were railed from Long Beach to Miami at which point the relevant
containers were destuffed. Thereafter, facilitated by presentation in each
case of the respective bills, Pronto was able to gain possession of these
goods and via a power of attorney issued by Miami Center Optical, to clear
these shipments through the United States' Customs.
On the evidence, the two shipments were released from storage by
Pronto to Miami Center Optical without the production of the original DCL
bills of lading in respect of each shipment. Attempts were made by the
plaintiff to obtain payment for the goods from Miami Center Optical but
without much success.
The plaintiff sought to recover the invoice value of the 596 cartons of
optical frames and sunglasses contained in the seventh and eight shipments.
Recovery was sought against the defendant in contract arising from the
defendant's acceptance of the plaintiff's instruction to the defendant to ship
these goods to Miami to the plaintiff's order, naming as notify party Miami
Center Optical, such contract being evidenced or partly evidenced by the
bills of lading issued for the seventh and eighth shipments. The plaintiff
also sought recovery in conversion arising from the wrongful misdelivery
of those goods.
The defendant relies upon the definition of 'port to port' shipment in
Clause 1 of the bills, Clause 6(2) relating to 'port to port' shipment and
Clause 14 relating to delivery, to contend that obligations under the bills
ceased on discharge or on storage of the goods after such discharge. The
particular clauses in question read as follows:
'1. DEFINITIONS ...
'Port to Port Shipment' arises where the Place of Receipt and the
Place of Delivery are not indicated on the front of this Bill of
Lading or if both the Place of Receipt and the Place of Delivery
indicated are ports and the Bill of Lading does not in the
nomination of the Place of Receipt or the Place of Delivery on the
front hereof specify any place or spot within the area of the port so
nominated.
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6. CARRIER'S RESPONSIBILITY ...
(2) PORT TO PORT SHIPMENT
The responsibility of the Carrier is limited to that part of the
Carriage from and during loading onto the vessel up to and
during discharge from the vessel and the Carrier shall not be
liable for any loss or damage whatsoever in respect of the
goods or for any other matter arising during any other part of
the Carriage even though Charges for the whole Carriage have
been charged by the Carrier. The Merchant constitutes the
Carrier as agent to enter into contracts on behalf of the
Merchant with others for transport, storage, handling or any
other services in respect of the Goods prior to loading and
subsequent to discharge of the Goods from the vessel without
responsibility for any act or omission whatsoever on the part of
the Carrier or others and the Carrier may as such agent enter
into contracts with others on any terms whatsoever including
terms less favourable than the terms in Bill of Lading.
14. DELIVERY OF GOODS
If delivery of the Goods or any part thereof is not taken by the
Merchant at the time and place when and where the Carrier is
entitled to call upon the Merchant to take delivery thereof, the
carrier shall be entitled without notice to remove from a Container
the Goods or that part thereof if stuffed in or on a Container and to
store the Goods or that part thereof ashore afloat, in the open or
under cover at the sole risk and expense of the Merchant. Such
storage shall constitute due delivery hereunder, and thereupon the
liability of the Carrier in respect of the Goods or that part thereof
shall cease.'
The learned Judge Stone J. held that, the established English
jurisprudence in this area being to protect to integrity of the bill of lading
as 'the key to the floating warehouse' was to be followed. Stone J.
declined to hold that the plain wording of Clause 14 was sufficiently clear
to 'impinge upon the cardinal principle requiring delivery by the (ship)
owner or his agent only against production of an original bill of lading'
although he accept that 'this particular clause purportedly is drawn in terms
of cesser of responsibility.' Reference was made by the learned judge to
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the observations made by the authors in Gaskell, Bills ofLading: Law and
Contracts 23
'Many of the clauses [as to due delivery] put obligations on receivers
to be ready to take delivery of goods and such receivers would be in
breach, eg if they are not ready to take delivery as soon as the vessel is
ready to discharge. Still, it would seem that a court is unlikely to
hold that this breach was a cause of the loss where the carrier puts the
cargo into storage and later delivers without production of a bill.'
It was held that Clause 14, when taken either alone or in conjunction
with Clause 6(2), was insufficient to 'empower the carrier intentionally to
deliver the goods without notice to anyone he wishes, and without
subsequently being called to account for such action', the same of which,
in effect, being the defendant's contention in that case. There was further
support for this view in Gaskell wherein the authors, in commenting on
The Antwerpen,24 note that,
, ... It is debatable whether an English court would hold that such a
general clause should excuse a deliberate decision to make delivery
without production of a bill ... '
It may be, as Lord Justice Mance commented in Matis, that a clause can be
designed to achieve this aim. However, his judg ment, Clause 14 does not
so succeed.
Conclusion
The Hong Kong Commercial Court has preserved the long well-established
principle that a carrier is having the prima facie fundamental obligation to
deliver goods upon presentation of original bills of lading, failing which
any misdelivery will be at the carrier's own risk and peril. Any
exemption clause attempting to exempt the carrier's liability for deliberate
or even conscious misdelivery whether without any original bill of lading
or against a forged bill of lading will be construed strictly against the
23 Gaskell, op cit at 12 at 449.
24 [19941 1 Lloyd's Rep. 213
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carrier. The attitude of the Hong Kong Court is unsympathetic to any
exemption clause which may have the effect of allowing a carrier to be
exempted from liability upon deliberate or even conscious misdelivery of
goods. This is in accordance to common sense in that the commercial
value of a bill of lading to its holder has to be fully respected and protected
by the law in order that both international trade and its financing may be
facilitated.
William K W Leung
Hong Kong
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